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STATUTORY RAPE: A GROWING
LIBERALIZATION
A. History of Statutory Rape
One of the oldest crimes found in Anglo-American law is that
of "statutory rape," defined as the offense of having sexual inter-
course with a female under statutory age, with or without the
female's consent." Apparently the first statutory mention of the
crime came in the reign of Edward I and was known as the Stat-
ute of Westminister.2 This historical statute made it a crime to
ravish, with or without consent, a maiden of under twelve, the
age at which a girl could legally consent to marriage. In Queen
Elizabeth I's reign, the age of consent was fixed at ten years by
statute. Any violation of a girl under this age with her consent
became "consent rape" and was punishable as a common law
rape.3
Sir Matthew Hale was of the opinion that sexual intercourse
with a girl under twelve years of age was rape, that being
the age of discretion at common law. When the punishment
for rape was mitigated by statute in England, females under
twelve years of age were considered incapable of consent;
but the punishment was again incurred by the statute of
Elizabeth and made to apply to all sexual intercourse with
girls under ten years of age, whether with or without their
consent; and this statute has been regarded as part of our
common law.4
The English statutes were generally accepted in America,
usually with an increase in the age of consent. Today, every state
provides for statutory rape,5 with the age of consent ranging
1. BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY 1427 (4th ed. 1951).
2. Statute of Westminster I, 1275, 3 Edw. 1, c. 13.
3. 18 Eliz. 1, c. 7, 4 (1576) ; see 1 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CRowN 628 (1736).
4. State v. Wilson, 162 S.C. 413, 426, 161 S.E. 104, 109 (1931).
5. Carnal knowledge of woman child-If any person shall unlawfully and
carnally know and abuse any woman child under the age of sixteen years,
such unlawful and carnal knowledge shall be a felony, and the offender
thereof being duly convicted shall suffer as for a rape; provided, however,
that when:
(1) The woman child is over the age of ten years and the prisoner is
found guilty the jury may find a special verdict recommending him to
the mercy of the court, whereupon the punishment shall be reduced to
imprisonment in the Penitentiary for a term not exceeding fourteen years,
at the discretion of the court;
(2) The woman child is over the age of fourteen years and the prisoner
is found guilty, the punishment shall be in the discretion of the court,
not exceeding five years imprisonment; and
254
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from seven 6 to twenty-one.7 Indeed, the overall effect of the
crime is astounding, when one realizes that from 1930-39, 59%
of all convicted sex offenders in New York City were convicted
of statutory rape." Evidently, the number convicted represents
but a small number of the offenses actually taking place.9
B. Elements
In a prosecution for statutory rape, the state must prove only
two elements-that the prosecutrix was under the age of consent
and that penetration occurred. A girl reaches the age of consent
on the day preceding her birthday marking the statutory age.
Intercourse occurring on this day is not within the statute.10
In South Carolina, the age of consent is sixteen. 1 Birth records
can be used to prove age, or lacking this, the prosecutrix's family
may introduce other evidence.'
2
Penetration, "the insertion of the male part into the female
part,"'8 is the other half of the crime. In short, the statute re-
quires only that the act of sexual intercourse occur. Penetration
to some degree is required.14 No matter how slight it may be,
any penetration at all fulfills the necessary requisite, and inter-
course is said to have taken place.' 5 There is also no requirement
of emission on the part of the male.'8
All jurisdictions hold that consent is not an element of statu-
tory rape, or even admissible in mitigation.17 Thus, in State v.
(3) The defendant is under eighteen years of age and the woman child
is above the age of fourteen years, previous unchastity may be defensively
shown, and if such want of chastity be found by special verdict of the
jury, the punishment imposed by the court shall not exceed one year's
imprisonment or a fine of not more than five hundred dollars, alternative-
ly awarded.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 11-80 (1962).
6. Delaware.
7. Tennessee.
8. 62 YALE L.J. 55, 748 n. 131 (1952).
9. See generally 43 N.C.L. Rav. 424 (1965).
10. 75 C.J.S. Rape 13 at 479 (1952).
11. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-80 (1962).
12. State v. Wagstaff, 202 S.C. 443, 25 S.E2d 484 (1943).
13. BLAcx, LAW DIcTIoNARY 1291 (4th ed. 1951).
14. State v. Moorer, 241 S.C. 487, 129 S.E2d 330 (1963).
15. State v. Worthy, 239 S.C. 449, 123 S.E.2d 835 (1962) ; State v. LeBlanc,
3 Brev. 339 (S.C. 1813).
16. State v. Worthy, 239 S.C. 449, 123 S.E.2d 835 (1962) ; State v. Wyatt,
221 S.C. 407, 70 S.E2d 635 (1952).
17. See, e.g., State v. Wade, 224 N.C. 760, 325 S.E.2d 314 (1944) ; People v.
Pantages, 212 Cal. 237 (1931); State v. Wilson, 162 S.C. 413, 161 S.E. 104
(1931); State v. Gilchrist, 54 S.C. 159, 31 S.E. 866 (1898).
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Boyd 8 the defendant who obtained the consent of the nine year
old prosecutrix of low intelligence, was sentenced to death; a
striking example of the teeth of the statute. The theory behind
prosecution in cases of consent is that the female's willingness
to consent is only apparent. She is regarded as resisting, no
matter what her state of mind, for the law is said to resist for
her.")
Unlike common law rape, force is unnecessary in statutory
rape.20 Nor is any resistance required on the part of the prose-
cutrix.2 1 However, the fact that the prosecutrix was either forced
or gave resistance does not require the state to choose between
prosecution for statutory rape or prosecution for common law
rape.22 Thus, where a defendant, convicted of statutory rape,
appealed, the South Carolina Supreme Court stated that the
conviction was good under either statutory or common law rape,
and the state could join the two in the same indictment.
23
6r. Why Statutory Rape?
What is the justification for statutory rape? One of the more
practical reasons advanced is that intercourse at a pre-pubescent
age can result in actual physical and mental damage. "The ex-
posure to sexual experience represents a real threat to the life
of a child. Anyone who tampers sexually with a young child is
potentially a killer and hence a dangerous individual outside
prison walls."24 Besides the real danger of adverse physical
effects, a child may be left with lasting mental scars. Early
sexual experiences are given excessive and distorted significance
with possible resultant psychological damage.2 However, the
fear of possible physical and mental injuries is usually appli-
cable only when the child is pre-pubescent. After puberty, there
18. 123 S.C. 24, 115 S.E. 809 (1923).
19. State v. Nagel, 75 N.D. 495, 28 N.W.2d 665 (1947).
20. State v. Whitener, 228 S.C. 244, 89 S.E.2d 701 (1955) ; State v. Weekly,
223 S.W.2d 494 (Mo. App. 1949); Addington v. Commonwealth, 161 Va. 975,
170 S.E. 565 (1933) ; Cabe v. State, 182 Ark. 49, 30 S.W2d 855 (1930) ; People
v. Guertin, 342 111. 99, 173 N.E. 824 (1930); State v. Christopher, 167 Iowa
109, 149 N.W. 40 (1914).
21. Addington v. Commonwealth, 161 Va. 975, 170 S.E. 565 (1933); People
v. Guertin, 342 Ill. 99, 173 N.E. 824 (1930).
22. State v. Harrison, 236 S.C. 246, 113 S.E.2d 783 (1960) ; State v. Horton,
209 S.C. 151, 39 S.E.2d 222 (1946) ; State v. Gilchrist, 54 S.C. 159, 31 S.E. 866
(1899).
23. State v. Harrison, 236 S.C. 246, 113 S.E.2d 783 (1960).
24. PLASCOWE, SEX AND THE LAW 184 (1951).
25. 62 YALE LJ. 55, 76 (1952).
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seems to be little likelihood of any danger. When girls of ten
or twelve years engage in sexual intercourse it is dangerous and
abnormal, but "when age limits are raised to sixteen, eighteen,
and- twenty-one, when the young girl becomes a young woman,
when adolescent boys as well as young men are attracted to her,
the sexual act begins to lose its quality of abnormality and
danger to the victim. '2 6 Therefore, it would seem quite clear
that as far as actual protection to a young girl is concerned,
pre-pubescence is the period of actual concern and, ideally,
statutes should provide solely for the protection of a child in
this age group. Unfortunately, the general holding is that, if a
girl is under the statutory age, it is of no consequence whether
or not she has passed puberty.27
The major policy underlying statutory rape is the protection
of children who, it is assumed, lack the proper conception of the
act and are unable to understand fully its consequences.28 Many
courts use the protection idea as a basis for the existence of the
statutes.2 9 This theory of protection has been termed the "Treas-
ure Theory."30 The idea is that virginity is a thing of social,
economic, and personal value, and at an early age, a girl is
incapable of properly dispensing this treasure for she is ignorant
as to the nature and implications of the sexual act. In order to
aid her in better defending herself, at an age when her natural
defenses are at a necessarily weak stage, the law provides added
deterrent by placing a penalty for any trespasser who seeks to
take advantage of her. This legal deterrent obviously serves a
valid purpose in protecting one with weak defenses. The fault
lies in a lack of flexibility which becomes more obvious as the
age of consent is raised. A sexually mature girl will soon learn
the rewards and penalties of premarital sex if she evinces inter-
est. One writer submits that a defendant should be allowed to
submit evidence that his partner understood the nature and
implication of the sex act.31 This solution would partially solve
26. PLASCOWE, supra note 24, at 184.
27. See, e.g., Fields v. State, 203 Ark. 1046, 159 S.W.2d 745 (1942); Lewis
v. State, 183 Miss. 192, 184 So. 53 (1938) ; Brock v. People, 98 Colo. 225, 54
P.2d 892 (1936); State v. Wilson, 162 S.C. 413, 161 S.E. 104 (1931).
28. Golden v. Commonwealth, 289 Ky. 379, 158 S.W.2d 967 (1942).
29. See, e.g., State v. Huntsman, 115 Utah 283, 204 P.2d 448 (1949) ; State
v. Schwartz, 215 Minn. 476, 10 N.W2d 370 (1943) ; State v. McPadden, 150
Minn. 62, 184 N.W. 568 (1921).
30. 62 YALE L.J. 55, 75 (1952).
31. Any man who has sexual intercourse with a girl under the age of seven-
teen years shall be guilty of rape. But if the girl is fourteen years or over
and comprehends the nature and implications of the sex act, then her
1966] NOTES'
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the dilemma presented by the case in which the girl is more
experienced than the boy, and it would seem reasonable to allow
such evidence into the record. This solution has been attempted,
but to no avail, in several states that lack a so-called "chastity
clause. 328
D. Defenses Available
Defenses to statutory rape do exist, although they are limited
to a relatively small minority of persons. In England, a boy
under fourteen could not commit rape.3 3 This presumption of
incapability was so strong that even in the face of a surgeon's
testimony that a defendant had reached full puberty, the court
ruled that he must have reached fourteen in order to be found
guilty.84 This idea of a conclusive presumption of incapability
seems to have found but little favor in the United States. How-
ever, two nineteenth century cases so hold;835 and Oregon pro-
vides by statute that a defendant under sixteen is incapable of
rape. 3 The majority of American courts, however, have found
boys to be capable, basing their decision on the grounds that
young females need to be protected from precocious boys. 7 The
majority, including South Carolina, appears to use a rebuttable
presumption that a defendant under fourteen is incapable of
forming a criminal intent and physically unable to perform the
sex act. By allowing evidence in rebuttal,38 the English view is
thus rejected. 9 This position follows well known medical au-
consent to the act in question shall be an absolute defense. The burden
of proving the girl's comprehension shall be on the accused and relevant
evidence of her previous experience in, or knowledge of, sexual matters,
from whatever source such experience or knowledge has been obtained,
shall be admissible for this purpose.
62 YALE L.J. 55, 75 (1952).
32. Parsons v. Brown, 160 Va. 810, 170 S.E. 1 (1933) ; People v. Marks, 146
App. Div. 11, 12, 130 N.Y.S. 524, 525 (1911).
33. Regina v. Phillips, 8 Car. & Payne Rep. 736 (1839).
34. Regina v. Jordan and Commeadow, 9 Car. & Payne Rep. 118 (1839).
35. Foster v. Commonwealth, 96 Va. 306, 31 S.E. 503 (1898) ; State v. Handy,
4 Harrington Rep. 567 (Pa. 1843). The Virginia case rested its refusal to
change the English common law on the difficulty or even inconvenience of ob-
taining proof of a boy's puberty under age of fourteen.
36. OREG N PENAL CODE § 23-420( ).
37. Beacon v. State, 96 Miss. 105, 50 So. 488 (1909).
38. Hiltabiddle v. State, 35 Ohio 52 (1878) ; William v. State, 14 Ohio 222
(1846) ; Commonwealth v. Green, 19 Mass. 380 (1824).
39. Beacon v. State, 96 Miss. 105, 50 So. 488 (1909); State v. Fisk, 15 N.
D. 589, 108 N.W. 485 (1906); State v. Coleman, 54 S.C. 162, 31 S.E. 866
(1898) ; Gordon v. State, 93 Ga. 531, 21 S.E. 54 (1893) ; Louisiana v. Jones, 39
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thority4 ° and cannot be reasonably disparaged. Most courts
recognize in males, therefore, that an arbitrary statutory age
does not allow for the multitudinous variations in development.
It is submitted that to recognize this variation in young males
and not in young females, creates a real and unfair double stand-
ard under most of our statutory rape laws.
Insanity, as in all crimes, is a valid defense in statutory rape.
In order to commit the offense, the intent to have sexual inter-
course with the prosecutrix must be present.4 ' However, the
defense of "irresistible impulse" is not recognized in South Caro-
lina.42 In one case the court intimated that "irresistible impulse"
would be a defense if it arose quickly and could not be resisted
short of third party interference. The court said that a mere
uncontrollable sex urge of which the defendant was both aware
and could plan moves to alleviate, was not to be considered an
"irresistible impulse." 48
E. Chastity Reguirement
Some states by statute allow in certain instances a showing of
unchaste behavior in the prosecutrix, either as a defense or as a
mitigating circumstance. In South Carolina, previous unchastity
may be shown when the prosecutrix is over fourteen and the
defendant is under eighteen. 44 The benefits of a requirement of
chastity of a prosecutrix over twelve are obvious. The require-
ment strikes to the very heart of the statutory rape problem by
protecting only the innocent. It requires no great imagination to
picture a situation in which a relatively inexperienced male
becomes sexually involved with an underage female who is
actually little better than a prostitute. Justice would seem to
cry out against the "protection of the defiled."45 The inclusion
of a previous chaste character requirement in the statute protects
innocence, as the statutes were originally intended to do.46
Florida, one of the more liberal states in the requirement of
chastity, allows evidence of mere loose moral conduct to be
40. See 31 IoWA L. REv. 659 n. 9 (1946).
41. Beason v. State, 96 Miss. 105, 50 So. 488 (1909).
42. State v. Gatlin, 208 S.C. 414, 38 S.E.2d 238 (1946); State v. Gilstrap,
205 S.C. 412, 32 S.E.2d 163 (1944).
43. Snider v. Smyth, 187 F. Supp. 299 (E.D. Va. 1960).
44. S.C. CODE Aim. § 16-80 (3) (1962).
45. State v. Snow, 252 S.W. 629 (Mo. 1923).
46. See generally 13 U. FLA. L. Rav. 213 (1960).
1966] NTomvs
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admitted in evidence. 47 Thus, the fact that prosecutrix had
venereal disease at age eleven, 48 that she habitually sat on the
laps of men,40 that she wrote letters to her boy friend inviting
him to visit with her,5" that her mother had seen her in bed with
a soldier,51 were all admissible in evidence in different cases.
2
In order for a conviction to result, the state has the burden of
proof as to the prosecutrix's chastity.53 Several other states be-
sides Florida follow this rule,54 but the majority of states pre-
sume chastity.55 There is some conflict as to whether "chaste"'
means physical or carries the broader connotation of overall
moral character.
We cannot think that a female who delights in lewdness,
who is guilty of every indecency, and lost to all sense of
shame, and who may even be the mistress of a brothel, is
equally the object of this statute (if she has only escaped
actual sexual intercourse) with an innocent and pure wom-
an; and that a man is equally liable under the law, as well
in the one case as the other.5"
In a Tennessee case, prosecutrix associated with prostitutes and
used her uncle's home as a place of assignation. The facts proved
that she was of lewd character, although no direct evidence as
to any prior act of intercourse was allowed.57 Evidence of foul
language and indecent jokes by prosecutrix was admitted by
one court, which held that unchastity extended beyond physical
bounds and included purity of mind and innocence of heart.55
An early South Carolina case admitted the general reputation
47. Any person who has unlawful carnal intercourse with any unmarried
person, of previous chaste character, who at the time of such intercourse is under
age of eighteen years, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for
not more than two years, or by fine not exceeding 2000 dollars. FLA. STAT.
§ 794.05 (1959).
48. Ward v. State, 149 Fla. 107, 5 So. 2d 59 (1941).
49. Dallas v. State, 76 Fla. 358, 79 So. 690 (1918).
50. Ibid.
51. Hickman v. State, 97 So. 2d 37 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1957).
52. See generally 13 U. FLA. L. Rav. 209, 210-12 (1960).
53. Dallas v. State, 76 Fla. 358, 79 So. 690 (1918).
54. Larson v. State, 125 Neb. 789, 252 N.W. 195 (1934) ; Humphrey v. State,
34 Okla. Crim. 247, 246 Pac. 486 (1926).
55. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 188 Miss. 339, 194 So. 922 (1940); Benton v.
State, 158 Tenn. 273, 12 S.W.2d 946 (1929) ; Williams v. State, 105 Tex. Crim.
381, 288 S.W. 205 (1926).
56. State v. Andre, 5 Iowa 389, 395 (1857).
57. Ledbetter v. State, 199 S.W.2d 112 (Tenn. 1947).
58. State v. Wilcoxen, 200 Iowa 1250, 206 N.W. 260 (1925).
[Vol. 18
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of prosecutrix before the rape as relevant to the issue of con-
sent.59 Although this was a common law rape prosecution, in the
light of the 1962 Code,60 it is probable that such evidence of
general reputation would be admissible in a statutory rape case.
It appears, however, that most states demand a showing that
the prosecutrix was not a virgin before the act complained of
occurred.
"[O]f chaste character" does not mean purity of mind, nor
purity of heart, but purity of body-i.e., that the prosecutrix
had never sustained illicit relations with anyone prior to the
alleged offense with the defendant.61
Similar reasoning is found in a Washington case, in which the
court said, "it [chastity] means a female who has never sub-
mitted to the sexual embrace of a man .... 1,62 The fact that
the prosecutrix was a virgin, although she lived in a house of
prostitution, prevented one defendant from claiming unchaste
character as a defense.63 In jurisdictions holding that chaste
character refers to physical virginity only, specific acts of sexual
intercourse are admissible when the defense is based on non-chas-
tity.64 The question immediately arises as to whether previous
acts with the defendant can be introduced to establish the prose-
cutrix's unchaste character. The court in Henry v. Stateo5 held
evidence of prior intercourse with the defendant was admissible.
In a similar case the court found the prosecutrix unchaste.(' The
best rule would seem to be that which does not allow the defend-
ant to rely on his own wrongs, thus not allowing evidence of
prior relations with defendant.67
For the purposes of the "chaste clause," some non-virgins are
considered chaste. Thus, neither an otherwise untarnished victim
59. State v. Taylor, 57 S.C. 483, 355 S.E. 729 (1900).
60. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-80(3) (1962).
61. Lowe v. State, 154 Fla. 730, 19 So. 2d 106, 108 (1944) ; accord, State v.
Sigler, 110 Wash. 581, 200 Pac. 323 (1921); Bailey v. State, 57 Neb. 706, 78
N.W. 284 (1899).
62. State v. Dache, 59 Wash. 238, 240, 109 Pac. 1050, 1051 (1910).
63. State v. Burns, 82 Conn. 213, 72 Atl. 1083 (1909).
64. Hickman v. State, 97 So. 2d 37 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1957); Ward v.
State, 149 Fla. 107, 5 So. 2d 59 (1941); Taylor v. State, 165 Tenn. 166, 53
S.W.2d 377 (1932) ; Moya v. People, 79 Colo. 104, 244 Pac. 69 (1926) ; Wil-
liams v. State, 105 Tex. Crim. 381, 288 S.W. 205 (1926).
65. 132 Tex. Crim. 148, 103 S.W.2d 377 (1937); accord, State v. Drake, 59
Wash. 238, 109 Pac. 1050 (1910).
66. Coots v. State, 110 Tex. Crim. 105, 75 S.W.2d 539 (1928).
67. State v. Sargeant, 62 Wash. 692, 114 Pac. 868 (1911).
1966] NoT~s
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of a prior forcible rape, 8 nor a widow is unchaste.6 9 These deci-
sions rest on the theory that "unchaste" refers only to illicit
intercourse.
In states which regard "unchaste" in the non-physical sense,
the concept of reformation is often present: "For it would be
inhuman and perilous to assume that women, once fallen, but
reformed, are afterwards exposed without redress to a seducer's
arts. The policy of the law in such cases is to reclaim and
guard117 ° This "fallen angel" idea gives a previously immoral
woman a second chance, allowing a revitalization of a supposedly
lost soul by clean living and circumspect behavior."1 While the
bad character of the woman is often a defense, the good character
of the defendant is not,72 although it may mitigate punishment."
The fact that a woman is married is not a defense in statutory
rape, as the prosecutrix is considered incapable of consent to an
illicit act."4 Thus, the claim that the statute was for the purpose
of protecting innocent and naive girls has been defeated on the
grounds that if the legislature had intended to exclude married
women, they could have easily done so." 5 In South Carolina a
defendant in a statutory rape case successfully defended on the
grounds that he and the prosecutrix were married by common-
law, the court holding that a man cannot rape his wife."6
F. Men Rea
The main point of contention with statutory rape crimes is the
absence of mistake of fact, or mens Tea, as a defense. Although
early English courts have recognized mistake of fact as a defense
in criminal prosecution since 1638,7 apparently the issue was
not raised in a statutory rape case until the mid-nineteenth cen-
68. Hickman v. State, 137 Tex. Civ. App. 616, 132 S.W.2d 598 (1939).
69. State v. Eddy, 40 S.D. 390, 167 N.W. 392 (1918).
70. 2 WHARTON, CRimiNAL LAW § 1757, at 602 (10th ed. 1898).
71. People v. Weinstock, 140 N.Y.S. 453 (Magis. Ct. 1912) ; State v. Thorn-
ton, 108 Mo. 640, 18 S.W. 841 (1891); State v. Moore, 78 Iowa 494, 43 N.W.
273 (1889) ; Patterson v. Haden, 17 Ore. 238, 21 Pac. 129 (1889).
72. State v. Jones, 145 Iowa 176, 123 N.W. 860 (1909).
73. Reid v. State, 290 P.2d 775 (Okla. Crim. Ct. App. 1955); People v.
Marks, 130 N.Y.S. 524 (Sup. Ct. 1911).
74. State v. Huntsman, 115 Utah 283, 204 P.2d 448 (1949), see generally 21
MD. L. Rav. (1961).
75. People v. Courtney, 4 Cal. Rptr. 274 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
76. State v. Ward, 204 S.C. 210, 28 S.E.2d 785 (1944).
77. Levitt's case, reported in Cook's case, Cro. Car. 537, 538, 79 Eng. Rep.
1063, 1064 (K.B. 1639).
[Vol. 18
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tury. The classic case is Regina v. Pinee,78 which, while not
dealing with statutory rape as such, considered the question of
a mistake of fact in an abduction case. Defendant, believing a
girl's statement that she was eighteen, took her from her father's
house. In reality, the girl was under sixteen and thereby fell
within a statutory prohibition for removal without permission
from the parent's home. In spite of a jury finding of reasonable
belief, the court held that defendant had assumed the risk of
his action and that, by merely taking the girl had evinced suf-
ficient intent as to be found guilty.
The act is intrinsically wrong; for the statute says if "un-
lawfully" done. The act done with mens rea is unlawfully
and carnally knowing the girl, and the man doing that act
does it at the risk of the child being under the statutory
age.
79
Therefore, with Prince as the precedent, American and English
jurisdictions have uniformly ruled that criminal intent is not
needed to sustain a conviction for statutory rape.80
This felony falls within the category of crimes "in which,
on grounds of public policy, certain acts are made punish-
able without proof that the defendant understands the facts
that give character to his act," . . . and proof of an intent
is not indispensable to conviction .... "The law makes the
crime, and infers a criminal intent from the act itself."81
Therefore, the law holds that the intent to do something immoral
(commit fornication) fulfills the requirement of general intent
in statutory rape.82 In our present day society, all extra-marital
sexual intercourse is considered wrong.83 Therefore, it may be
said that the mens Pea requirement is fulfilled because the actor
intends to do an immoral act, and if in the commission of
such act, he does a statutorily forbidden act unintentionally,
78. 13 Lox Crim. Car. 138 (Crim. App. 1875).
79. Id. at 139; accord, Heath v. State, 173 Ind. 296, 90 N.E. 310 (1910).
80. See, e.g., Miller v. State, 16 Ala. App. 534, 79 So. 314 (1918); Heath v.
State, 173 Ind. 296, 90 N.E. 310 (1910); People v. Lewellyn, 314 Ill. 106, 145
N.E. 289 (1924) ; State v. Duncan, 82 Mont. 170, 266 Pac. 400 (1928) ; State
v. Wade, 224 N.C. 760, 32 S.E.2d 314 (1944) ; Manning v. State, 43 Tex. Crim.
302, 65 S.W. 920 (1901).
81. Simmons v. State, 151 Fla. 778, 782-83, 10 So. 2d 436, 438 (1942) ; accord,
State v. Wade, 224 N.C. 760, 32 S.E.2d 314 (1944).
82. See State v. Houx, 109 Mo. 654, 19 S.W. 35 (1892).
83. Fornication is a sin. 1 Corinthians 10:8; 1 Thessalonians 4:3.
1966] NoTs
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he had sufficient criminal intent to project him outside the pale
of the law. 8
4
The absence of a mens rea requirement in statutory rape should
not be confused with the so-called "public welfare offenses."
"The term, 'public welfare offenses,' is used to denote the group
of police offenses and criminal nuisances, punishable irrespective
of the actor's state of mind, which have been developing in
England and America within the past three-quarters of a cen-
tury . ,,.5 These offenses are usually of a regulatory nature
and are generally punished, not by imprisonment, but by fines.
Illegal sale of liquor, traffic violations, and health regulations
are noteworthy examples of these public welfare violations.,
However, statutory rape is not included in these relatively minor
violations as often substantial jail sentences are invoked against
offenders. "The reason that mistake of fact as to the girl's age
constitutes no defense is, not that these crimes like public welfare
offenses require no mens rea, but that a contrary result would
strip the victim of the protection which the law exists to afford.
Public policy requires it."187 Therefore, statutory rape has no
real nens rea requirement, and the defense of mere ignorance
will not suffice.88 Indeed, an honest mistake of fact, such as the
mature appearance of, or a misrepresentation by, the prosecutrix
will not serve as a defense, 9 for in such a case defendant pro-
ceeds at his own risk.
[I]gnorance of the age of the prosecutrix on the part of the
defendant in a prosecution for such crime committed on a
female under a prohibited age constitutes no defense, no
matter whether such ignorance was based on a good faith
belief that the prosecutrix was above the prohibited age, or
on an exercise of reasonable care to ascertain her age, or
whether the defendant was mislead by her appearance or
her misrepresentation.9'
84. People v. Griffin, 117 Cal. 583, 49 Pac. 711 (1897) ; Commonwealth v.
Murphy 165 Mass. 66, 42 N.E. 504 (1896) ; State v. Houx, 109 Mo. 654, 19
S.W. 3Y (1892).
85. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLux. L. Rav. 55 n.5 (1933).
86. Id. at 72.
87. Id. at 74.
88. Commonwealth v. Murphy, 165 Mass. 66, 42 N.E. 504 (1896).
89. Commonwealth v. Sarricks, 161 Pa. Super. 577, 56 A.2d 323 (1948);
Simmons v. State, 151 Fla. 778, 10 So. 2d 436 (1942) ; Harris v. State, 115 Tex.
Crim. 227, 28 S.W.2d 813 (1930); Manning v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. 320, 65
S.W. 920 (1901).
90. Farrell v. State, 152 Tex. Civ. App. 488, 215 S.W.2d 625 (1948).
91. State v. Wade, 224 N.C. 760, 761, 32 S.E.2d 314, 315 (1944).
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While ignorance of age is generally not a defense, an honest
mistake is at times allowed to mitigate the punishment. 92 How-
ever, there may be limitations even when allowed. For example,
a reasonable mistake of age is a valid defense under the New
Mexico Statute, but only if the prosecutrix is between thirteen
and sixteen years of age: 93 that provided by statutes which
specifically require mens rea for statutory rape.
The possible start of a new and liberal trend occurred recently
in California, when the California court found that a specific
statement negating the common law requirement of mens r'ea was
needed in the statute in order to void a mistake of fact defense.94
Overruling a strong case precedent,95 the court found this a
general requirement of criminal intent in California statutes. 0
Dismissing the analogy with public welfare crimes, the court
stated ". . . this court has moved away from the imposition of
criminal sanctions in the absence of culpability where the govern-
ing statute, by implication or otherwise, expresses no legislative
intent to be served by imposing strict liability. 91 By finding,
in the absence of specific legislative language to the contrary, a
need for mens rea, the court drew abreast of the times,98 recog-
nizing that modern necessity and realism requires the removal
of the outdated failure of mistake of fact as a defense.
The decision's impact might be weakened by the court's reliance
on the California Code requirement.9 This reliance would not
handicap courts in jurisdictions with statutes containing similar
92. Law v. State, 92 Ohio St. 444, 224 P.2d 278 (1950) ; Manship v. People,
99 Colo. 1, 58 P2d 1215 (1936).
93. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40 A-9-3, 40-9-4, (Supp. 1964).
94. People v. Hernandez, 39 Cal. Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
95. People v. Ratz, 115 Cal. 132, 46 Pac. 915 (1896).
96. In every crime or public offense there must exist a union or joint oper-
ation of act and intent, or criminal negligence.
CAl. PENAL CODE § 20 (1872).
All persons are capable of committing crimes except those belonging to
the following classes: ... Persons who committed the act or made the
omission charged under ignorance or mistake of fact, which deprives any
criminal intent.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 26 (1872).
97. People v. Hernandez, smpra note 94, at 363, 393 P.2d at 675.
98. Previous California Supreme Court decisions requiring specific exclusion
of inens rea for crimes have pointed to the Hernandez decision. See People v.
Winston, 46 Cal. 2d 151, 293 P.2d 40 (1956), requiring intent in possession of
narcotics prosecution; People v. Vogel, 41 Cal. 2d 798, 299 P.2d 850 (1956),
allowing a showing of defendant's good faith in bigamy trial; People v. Stuart,
47 Cal. 2d 167, 302 P.2d 5 (1958), holding no absolute liability under an accident
resulting from a lack of required skill.
99. Cal. Penal Code §§ 20, 26; supra note 96.
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provisions, but in states without a statutory declaration of needed
intent, difficulty could arise. It is to be hoped, however, that
courts, seeing the way broken by California will be emboldened
to proceed as no doubt their sense of justice and realism directs
them. In this manner, there might be a renaissance of judicial
thought in American courts concerning statutory rape, thus keep-
ing justice parallel with modern fact.
G. GoncZusion
It would seem that in order to protect against possible injus-
tices under statutory rape prosecutions, the state legislatures
could do either of two things. Like Florida, they could place a
"chaste character" requirement in their statute, allowing a de-
fense against ensnarement by a prostitute of tender years, but
affording ample protection for those that the original statute
was designed to protect. They could also specifically place a
criminal intent requirement in the statute, thus accomplishing
by statute what Hermandez accomplished by judicial decision.
Fortunately, the South Carolina statute appears to be among
the most liberal. It provides for graduated punishments when
the prosecutrix is over ten, with extreme judicial discretion.10 0
The state legislature could go a step further, however, by allow-
ing as a defense "mistake of fact" when the prosecutrix has
passed puberty. In this manner, it would be difficult to imagine
any injustices arising in South Carolina under a statutory rape
statute.
ERA&n G. PREVOST
100. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-80 (1962).
[Vol. 18
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